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The current research examines the importance of considering 
individual differences relevant to the basic processes underlying 
a reduction in prejudice toward stigmatized groups. In particular, 
we examine the stability associated with reducing prejudice 
in individuals who vary in their need for cognition. Need for 
cognition (NC, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) refers to the tendency to 
engage in and enjoy effortful thought. Individuals high in NC tend 
to form attitudes on the basis of an effortful analysis of the quality 
of the relevant information in a persuasive message (i.e., high 
thinking processes), whereas people low in NC tend to be more 
reliant on simple peripheral cues (i.e., low thinking processes) in 
the persuasion context (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 
1996; Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009; for reviews). 
Although persuasion can occur when thinking is high or low, the 
long-term consequences of high and low elaboration processes are 
different. Thus, we examined in this research the extent to which 
newly-changed attitudes of relatively high NC individuals are 
more persistent than the newly-changed attitudes of relatively low 
NC individuals.
Contemporary prejudice is thought to be more complex and 
expressed more subtly than traditional prejudice (Devine, 1989; 
Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Hence, traditional perspectives have 
been replaced by more contemporary approaches to prejudice such 
as subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), aversive racism 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) and symbolic racism (Sears, 1988). In 
contrast to traditional prejudice, which is overt and blatant, these 
contemporary approaches conceptualize prejudice as a subtle, 
often unintentional, unaware, and even unconscious form of bias.
Based on this supposed subtle nature of prejudice (e.g., it 
can be held and expressed in unconscious ways), some scholars 
have considered that the best strategies for fi ghting it might also 
be subtle. Thus, recommended techniques aimed at reducing 
prejudice are often based on processes that imply little thinking. 
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Abstract
Background: The purpose of this study was to examine the role of 
thinking in reducing prejudice toward stigmatized groups. Method: 
Participants received a persuasive message composed of strong arguments 
in favor of South American immigrants or a control message. In order to 
distinguish high- from low-elaboration individuals, participants were asked 
to complete the Need for Cognition Scale (NC). Results: As expected, 
attitude change was equivalent for individuals with relatively high and low 
NC. Importantly, although both high- and low-NC participants showed 
a reduction in the extremity of prejudiced attitudes, the stability of these 
changes was different. Two days later, the changes produced in participants 
with high NC were found to be more persistent than equivalent changes 
produced in participants with low NC. Conclusions: An understanding of 
the processes through which prejudiced attitudes are modifi ed can provide 
information about the long-term stability of such changes.
Keywords: prejudice, need for cognition, persuasion, attitudes.
Resumen
El efecto de la Necesidad de Cognición sobre la estabilidad de las actitudes 
hacia los inmigrantes sudamericanos. Antecedentes: el objetivo de este 
estudio era examinar el papel de la elaboración mental en la reducción del 
prejuicio hacia grupos estigmatizados. Método: la mitad de los participantes 
recibió un mensaje persuasivo compuesto por argumentos fuertes a favor 
de los inmigrantes sudamericanos en España. La otra mitad de participantes 
recibió un mensaje control. Con la fi nalidad de distinguir a los individuos 
con mayor o menor motivación para procesar la información recibida, 
los participantes completaron la escala de Necesidad de Cognición (NC). 
Resultados: el cambio de actitud hacia los inmigrantes sudamericanos fue 
equivalente para todos los participantes independientemente de su NC. 
Sin embargo, la estabilidad de ese cambio de actitudes varió en función 
de las diferencias individuales en NC. Dos días más tarde, los cambios 
producidos en las actitudes de los individuos que puntuaron alto en la 
escala de NC fueron más persistentes que aquellos cambios que tuvieron 
lugar en las actitudes de los individuos con bajas puntuaciones en NC. 
Conclusiones: considerar la cantidad de pensamiento implicada en las 
campañas de reducción de prejuicio puede resultar informativa de cara a 
sus efectos y consecuencias a largo plazo.
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For example, the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), one of the 
most well known strategies for reducing intergroup confl ict, has 
been claimed to rely on processes requiring little information 
processing, such as mere exposure (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), 
classical conditioning (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003), 
self-perception (“if we do things together, I must like this person,” 
Bem, 1972), and use of heuristics (“if most other people do not 
seem prejudiced, it must be wrong,” Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). All 
of these psychological mechanisms provide plausible low effort 
processes by which prejudice reduction strategies (e.g., mere 
contact) might be effective in reducing prejudiced attitudes toward 
a stigmatized group. 
Nonetheless, according to a variety of theories of persuasion, 
attitude change can not only be produced by low-thinking processes 
but also by deliberative thoughtful processes (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). For example, in line with the earliest deliberative theories 
of message learning (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953), Pettigrew 
(1998) proposed that “learning about others” is a critical step in 
how intergroup contact improves intergroup relations (Allport, 
1954). In accord with this view, there are numerous examples of 
how prejudice is reduced by attendance at diversity group seminars, 
and learning new information about other social groups (Fisher, 
1968; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). Furthermore, consistent 
with the cognitive response theory of persuasion (Petty, Ostrom, & 
Brock, 1981), the self-generation of counter-stereotypical images 
and thoughts has proven to be another effective (thoughtful) 
method of prejudice reduction (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001). 
Taken together, this body of evidence suggests that in addition to 
relatively low effort mechanisms such as classical conditioning and 
mere exposure, high thinking processes such as the self-generation 
of counter-stereotypical thoughts or dissonance processes are also 
capable of producing changes in prejudiced attitudes. 
Prior research has shown that people vary in the extent to 
which they enjoy effortful thinking, and this variation predicts the 
likelihood that people will engage in relatively high or low thinking 
processes. For example, Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982) has been used as a way to determine the mechanism by which 
individuals’ judgments would be formed or changed. Considerable 
research has suggested that low NC individuals are, absent some 
incentive to the contrary, more likely to rely on simple cues in a 
persuasion situation (Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1984) and on 
stereotypes alone in judging other people (Carter, Hall, Careney, 
& Rosip, 2006) than are those high in NC. Those high in NC are 
more likely to consider all of the pertinent information. Thus, if 
cues and stereotypes have any impact on high NC individuals, it 
is more likely to be an indirect effect and occur by a mechanism 
that requires some cognitive effort (e.g., by biasing processing of 
the other information available; Petty, Schumann, Richman, & 
Strathman, 1993; Wegener, Clark, & Petty, 2006). 
Notably, since individuals high (vs. low) in NC typically 
engage in more thinking, they also tend to have stronger attitudes 
(i.e., attitudes that are more accessible in memory, persistent over 
time, resistant to change, and infl uential in determining subsequent 
behavior and information-processing (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). 
Additionally, because individuals high (vs. low) in NC engage in 
more thinking, they tend to form stronger automatic associations 
among attitude objects, and to generalize their changes to other 
beliefs related to the attitude object (Petty et al., 2009).
For example, in one study, Haugtvedt and Petty (1992) provided 
individuals who were high and low in their NC with a persuasive 
message about a new consumer product. Although both high and 
low NC individuals were persuaded equally by the ad (though 
via different processes), the attitudes of the high NC participants 
decayed less than the attitudes of low NC individuals over a 
2-day period. This example suggests that the amount of thinking 
involved in the persuasion process is critical to an understanding 
of the further stability associated with the changes obtained. What 
remains to be examined is whether individual differences in NC are 
also associated with stability in the domain of prejudiced attitudes 
toward stigmatized groups. 
Another relevant antecedent comes from research by Wegener, 
Clark and Petty (2006) who showed that group stereotypes can 
infl uence judgments about individuals in both thoughtful and 
non-thoughtful ways. Although all the participants in their studies 
relied upon stereotypes in making explicit judgments about target 
individuals, and the judgments appeared to be the same (i.e., they 
were equally extreme) across high and low elaboration conditions, 
the consequences of these stereotype-based judgments differed 
depending on the amount of processing of the target information 
presented. Specifi cally, judgments made under high elaboration 
conditions were found to be more resistant to change. This research 
suggests that differential consequences for resistance to change are 
associated with different attitude-change mechanisms depending 
on the amount of thinking (see also Clark, Wegener, Briñol, & 
Petty, 2009).
The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of 
thinking in reducing prejudice toward minority groups in both the 
short and the longer term. Specifi cally, this research examined 
whether prejudiced attitudes changed as a result of a high 
thinking process would be more stable than attitudes changed 
through low thinking processes, even when the initial change 
was apparently the same (i.e., the extremity of the attitude was 
identical for high and low thinking groups). Participants received 
a persuasive message composed of strong arguments in favor 
of South American immigrants or a group-irrelevant message 
composed of strong arguments in favor of introducing swipe 
cards at the university. We predicted that participants would 
show more favorable attitudes toward immigrants after reading 
the relevant than the control message. In addition, we did not 
expect individual differences in NC to moderate this pattern 
since people can change their attitudes through either high or low 
thinking processes. Since the message in favor of South American 
immigrants contained both strong arguments and positive cues, 
we expected no differences in attitude extremity for high and 
low elaboration participants immediately following receipt of 
the message. If changes in this specifi c domain of prejudice 
for those relatively high NC are proved to be more stable than 
changes of those with relatively low NC then the present research 
has the potential to make a contribution to both attitude change 
literature and the prejudice domain, and do so at the conceptual 
and practical level. 
Since the consequences of high and low elaboration processes 
are different, we predicted that the newly-changed attitudes 
of high elaboration (NC) individuals would be more persistent 
than the newly-changed attitudes of low elaboration individuals. 
Persistence refers to the extent to which a newly-changed attitude 
endures over time even if it is never attacked directly, and 
persistence is commonly considered to be an important indicator 
of attitude strength (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Krosnick, 
1995).





Seventy-six undergraduates (48 women and 28 men) (mean 
age: 20.1; SD= 2.37) from the Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid (UCM) were assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Message vs. 
Control) × Extent of elaboration (Need for Cognition: continuous 




Upon arrival, participants read a persuasive message in favor 
of South American immigrants or an irrelevant message about 
introducing swipe cards at the university. Then, the participants 
were asked to complete a questionnaire designed to asses their 
attitudes about South American immigrants. Two days after initial 
exposure to the persuasive message, subjects returned to the same 
laboratory to express again their beliefs about the immigrants. 
Thus, participants attitudes toward South American immigrants 
were assessed both immediately following receipt of the message 
(Time 1) and two days later (Time 2). Finally, participants were 
debriefed and dismissed. None of the participants reported to know 
the hypothesis behind the research.
Instruments 
 
Persuasive message. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
persuasive message condition or to the control message condition. 
In the persuasive message condition, participants were asked to read 
a positive persuasive message about South American immigrants. 
The persuasive message was constructed to contain both strong 
arguments and positive peripheral cues, so that both relatively 
high and low NC individuals’ attitudes could change. The message 
in favor of South American immigrants contained seven strong 
arguments about the benefi ts of receiving immigrants in Spain. The 
arguments selected were pre-tested and shown to produce mostly 
favorable thoughts. Of course, individuals with relatively low NC 
were not expected to engage in much thinking about the message in 
the study when not specifi cally instructed to do so. 
The gist of one of the strong arguments was that South American 
immigrants help to stimulate the national economy because of 
their crucial role in the industrial infrastructure. In addition to a 
set of compelling arguments, the immigrant-relevant persuasive 
message also contained other information that could serve as a cue 
for identifying the direction and credibility of the proposal. For 
example, the information was claimed to be taken from prestigious 
sources with high credibility (e.g., Wall Street Journal, prestigious 
sociologists). The positive direction of the message was also evident 
from the title of the message (The Benefi ts of Immigration), which 
could work as an important cue for participants to be able to infer 
the position advocated even without thinking about the merits of 
the arguments. In the control message condition, participants read 
an immigrant-irrelevant, positive message about the benefi ts of 
introducing swipe cards. 
Extent of elaboration. Participants completed the Spanish 
version of the 18-item version of the NC scale (Falces, Briñol, 
Sierra, Becerra, & Alier, 2001). The Spanish version of the scale 
has psychometric properties similar to those of the original scale, 
including a single-factor structure (Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, 
Horcajo, & Strathman, 2008; for additional examples of the use of 
Spanish version of the scale, see, Briñol et al., 2005; Briñol et al., 
2007). This scale includes statements such as “I like to have the 
responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking” 
or “Thinking is not my idea of fun” (reverse-scored). Participants 
responded to each statement on a fi ve-point scale anchored at 
“extremely uncharacteristic of me” and “extremely characteristic 
of me.” Responses to each item were averaged to form a composite 
NC score (α= .80). Scores on the scale ranged from 2.5 to 4.5, with a 
median of 3.5; (M= 3.51, SD= .49) . Scores were not affected by the 
message manipulation (Mean of NC for the pro-immigrant message 
group= 3.514, SD= .48; Mean for the control message group= 
3.519, SD= .51) Fs <1. Finally, the overall correlation between NC 
scores and prejudiced attitudes following the persuasive message 
(Time1) was not signifi cant, r= .19, p= .113.
Prejudiced attitudes following the persuasive message. 
Participants’ attitudes toward immigrants were assessed by 
averaging the responses to four highly related (α= .91) nine-point 
scales (i.e., unappealing vs. appealing, unpleasant vs. pleasant, 
not unlikeable vs. likeable, I do not like them vs. I do like them). 
Although in Spain, attitudes toward South American immigrants 
tend to be positive in absolute terms (i.e., on the positive side of a 
scale), these attitudes were assumed to be less favorable than those 
toward the dominant (majority) group (Spaniards). Given that 
whether an attitude is prejudiced or not is a relative (rather than an 
absolute) question, such evaluations can be considered prejudiced 
toward immigrants. To verify our assumption of prejudice toward 
South American immigrants in Spain, we collected data from the 
current subject population by randomly assigning a sample of 158 
students to indicate how much they liked either Spaniards or South-
Americans on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). 
Consistent with the idea that evaluations of immigrants are less 
favorable than those toward natives, participant’s evaluations 
toward the out-group (South American immigrants) were 
signifi cantly less positive (M= 5.7, SD= 1.09) than participant’s 
evaluations of the in-group (Spaniards) (M= 6.23, SD= .93), 
t(152)= 3.27, p= .001. That is, even though attitudes toward a 
South American immigrant were on the positive side of the scale, 
attitudes were still less favorable than those toward the dominant 
(majority) group. Furthermore, these evaluations were signifi cantly 
correlated (r= .58, p= .01) with behavioral intentions toward these 
groups (composite measure of items such as “Would you be willing 
to hire people from this group?”). These fi ndings suggest that the 
measures used in this research can have real world implications for 
potential discrimination.
Prejudiced attitudes after two days (persistence). In order to 
assess the extent to which a newly-changed attitude endures over 
time, participants returned to the laboratory two days after initial 
exposure to the pro-immigrant message to once again express their 
attitudes toward South American immigrants. The delayed measure 
of attitude toward South American immigrants was assessed by 
averaging the responses to the same four closely related (α= .90) 
nine-point differential scales used previously.
Data analysis
All dependent measures were submitted to a multiple regression 
analysis, with Persuasive Message (Message vs. Control; dummy 
coded), and Extent of Elaboration (NC; continuous variable) as 
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the independent variables. Analyses followed the regression 
procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991).
Prejudiced Attitudes (Time 1). As expected, the results of a 
Persuasive Message × Extent of Elaboration regression analysis 
at Time 1 revealed only a signifi cant main effect of the Persuasive 
Message, β= .50, t(69)= 3.08, p= .003. This main effect indicated 
that participants’ attitudes were more favorable toward immigrants 
after reading the pro-inmigrant persuasive message (M= 6.07, SD= 
1.47) than after reading the neutral control message about benefi ts 
of introducing swipe cards at the university (M= 5.03 , SD= 1.19). 
Moreover, the main effect of NC, β= .27, t(69)= 1.71, p= .09, and the 
two-way interaction, β= .04, t(68)= .27, p= .79, were not signifi cant. 
Prejudiced Attitudes (Time 2). Attitudes assessed after two days 
were analyzed as a stability measure. Given that there were no 
differences other than the message effect on initial attitudes, we 
included those attitudes at Time 1 as a covariate in the multiple 
regression analysis. As one might expect, attitudes at Time 1 
signifi cantly predicted attitudes at Time 2, β= .57, t(55)= 7.00, 
p<.001. Most importantly, the analysis of the second evaluation (48 
hours later) revealed a signifi cant interaction between Persuasive 
Message and NC on this measure, β= .33, t(54)= 3.15, p= .003. 
To examine the basis of this interaction, the interaction was 
decomposed by using the re-centering procedure advocated by 
Aiken and West (1991). When this interaction was broken down 
into relatively high (analyzed at +1 SD) or low (analyzed at -1 SD) 
NC individuals, there was a signifi cant effect of message among 
high NC participants, β= .49, t(54)= 3.40, p= .001, but not among 
low NC individuals, β= -.17, t(54)= -1.07, p= .29. Furthermore, the 
predicted interaction revealed that as the scores on NC increased, 
attitudes tended to increase for the pro-inmigrant message β= .40, 
t(36)= 3.67, p= .001, but not for the control message (p = .12). This 
difference in delayed attitudes as a function of NC in the relevant 
message condition is notable given that the initial attitudes in 
response to the proposal were identical irrespective of NC. 
Discussion
 
The results of this study revealed that attitude change was 
equivalent for relatively high and low NC individuals immediately 
after receiving the persuasive message. This makes sense since the 
treatment included suffi cient information for change regardless of 
the amount of thinking. That is, the persuasive message was made 
up of compelling arguments, but also of simple, positive cues. Most 
importantly, this study also revealed that the effects of a persuasive 
appeal on prejudiced attitudes were more evident after a delay of 
two days for relatively high (vs. low) NC participants. This pattern 
of results would be consistent with prior research on persuasion 
suggesting that attitude strength can be affected by elaboration 
(Petty & Krosnick, 1995).
The degree of stability of participants’ attitudes toward 
immigrants is an important feature to consider, since the goal of most 
prejudice-reduction interventions is to create attitudes that will be 
persistent and impactful. Although the persistence of participants’ 
attitudes can be highly informative of their future behavior, it is 
also essential to assess other features of attitude strength, such as 
accessibility, prediction of behavior, and resistance to counter-
attitudinal information (Cárdaba, Briñol, Horcajo, & Petty, 2012). 
An important matter for future research is the exploration 
of whether prejudicial attitudes might show some additional 
properties associated with strength when changed through high 
elaboration processes. For example, we noted earlier that attitude 
change processes which require thinking deeply about the attitude 
object are likely to result in attitude representations that are well 
integrated and connected with other relevant material in memory 
(McGuire, 1981; Tesser, 1978). Because of the strong linkage 
among constructs associated with high thinking, activating one 
mental representation should activate related cognitive elements 
easily. Indeed, within the literature on attitudes toward persuasive 
proposals there is evidence that it is easier to activate related 
constructs for individuals with high NC than it is for those with 
low NC (Petty et al., 2008). An important question to examine 
would concern the extent to which this argument holds for attitudes 
regarding stigmatized groups. The implication might be that 
programs (requiring high thinking) for reducing prejudice toward 
one particular stigmatized group might also be helpful in making 
people more egalitarian with regard to other groups. In other words, 
future work should examine whether changes through deliberative 
processes in one specifi c domain of prejudice can show evidence 
of generalization to different groups, other than the one targeted by 
the persuasive treatment. 
Furthermore, future research should examine whether 
manipulating (rather than measuring) the extent of thinking about 
a pro-immigrant message would produce similar effects. Indeed, 
one limitation of the present study is that provides correlational 
evidence for our critical hypothesis, and differences in NC might 
be overlap with differences in other constructs. For example, 
an alternative interpretation might be that participants high in 
NC could express more desirable responses than those low in 
NC. In that case, those with high (vs. low) NC might think that 
the experimenter wanted them to report more stability and had 
more need to fulfi ll those expectations. Although plausible, this 
alternative does not seem likely to apply to the present data since 
previous research has found no correlation between NC and social 
desirability (Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009). Likewise, 
in our study participants who scored relatively high in NC were 
not more likely to express suspicions about the experimental 
hypothesis than participants with relatively low NC. In any case, 
future research needs to measure and manipulate the amount of 
thinking with constructs other than the one used in this particular 
study (NC)
Furthermore, as noted, although attitudes toward the 
discriminated group (South American immigrants) are more 
negative in relative terms than attitudes toward the in-group 
(Spaniards), these attitudes tend to be mostly positive in absolute 
terms. It would be important for future research to examine the 
role of need for cognition in reducing prejudice toward groups for 
which attitudes are negative not only in relative but also in absolute 
terms. Furthermore, given the subtle nature of modern prejudice 
and the potential social desirability concerns, future research can 
also benefi t from including additional measures, such us automatic 
evaluations, and measures of ambivalence and discriminatory 
behavior (e.g., Maio, Haddock, Watt, & Hewstone, 2009). 
Finally, the studies described in this research, apart from their 
implications for reducing prejudiced attitudes, might also provide 
some potential insights for assessing hidden effects of interventions 
and egalitarian programs. For example, recent research in the 
domain of persuasion has shown that when people appear to have 
resisted persuasion on traditional measures, there may be some 
potentially important, yet previously hidden, persuasive effects on 
the confi dence with which people hold those apparently unaffected 
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attitudes (Tormala & Petty, 2002; Rucker & Petty, 2004; Rucker, 
Petty, & Briñol, 2008). It is plausible to imagine that under some 
circumstances, although participants were not infl uenced by 
persuasive messages on attitudinal measures (e.g., as a result of 
demand characteristics, evaluation apprehension, impression 
management, social desirability or self-awareness limitations), 
strength measures might still be affected (Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 
2004). The present research suggests that such hidden changes in 
the domain of prejudiced attitudes are more likely to occur under 
high (rather than low) thinking conditions. This fi nding is also 
consistent with research showing that although explicit measures 
might not reveal any change after a persuasive treatment based 
on “thoughtful” approaches, the automatic evaluative associations 
that exist with respect to the attitude object may indeed indicate 
change (Petty et al., 2009). Thus, researchers interested in studying 
prejudice, and prejudice reduction in particular, might sometimes 
be able to use perceptions of change (and other strength-related 
measures) as attitude researchers have used attitude confi dence 
(and automatic evaluations) as a way of indicating that a message 
has had some hidden persuasive effect.
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